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Let’s Try This Again, Separate 
Educational Facilities Are Inherently 
Unequal: Why Minnesota Should Issue a 
Desegregation Order and Define 
Adequacy in Cruz-Guzman v. State 
Christie Geter† 
Introduction 
Nikole Hannah-Jones,1 a reporter for The New York Times, 
remembers watching the nightly news in 2014.2  Eighteen-year-old 
Michael Brown had just been shot and killed by a Ferguson police 
officer. His mother, Lezley McSpadden,3 was “standing in a crowd 
of onlookers, a few feet from where her son was shot down, where 
he would lie face down on the concrete for four hours, dead,” and 
 
 †. J.D. University of Minnesota Law School, 2019; B.A., University of New 
Mexico, 2012. The author expresses her appreciation to Professor Myron Orfield and 
JaneAnne Murray for their guidance and support, as well as the staff and editors of 
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their dedication in preparing 
this article for publication. The author would also like to thank her parents, Larry 
and Val for their strength and tenacity in overcoming obstacles, support, and 
encouragement for their children, and faith and hope in a better tomorrow.  
 1. Nikole Hannah-Jones, https://nikolehannahjones.com [https://perma.cc/
BKR7-XSEN] (“Nikole Hannah-Jones is an award-winning investigative reporter 
covering racial injustice for The New York Times Magazine . . . .”) She investigates 
the way racial segregation in housing and schools is maintained through official 
action and policy. Nikole Hannah-Jones, Choosing a School for My Daughter in a 
Segregated City, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2016/06/12/magazine/choosing-a-school-for-my-daughter-in-a-segregated-city.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/WV7T-ADN9] (“I rode the bus an hour each morning across 
town to the ‘best’ public school my town had to offer . . . . I have no doubt my parents’ 
decision to pull me out of my segregated neighborhood school made the possibility of 
my getting from there to here — staff writer for The New York Times Magazine — 
more likely.”). 
 2. This American Life: The Problem We All Live With—Part One, CHI. PUB. 
RADIO (July 31, 2015) (downloaded using iTunes) [hereinafter This American Life]. 
 3. Lezley McSpadden ran for Ferguson city council in 2018. Though she did not 
secure one of the six council seats, she garnered national attention for the historic 
run. See Eli Rosenberg, ‘This Is One of My First Steps’: Michael Brown’s Mother Plans 
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she said, “You took my son away from me. You know how hard it 
was for me to get him to stay in school and graduate? Do you know 
how many [B]lack men graduate? Not many!”4 Hannah-Jones 
recalls, “of all the ways [McSpadden] could have expressed her grief 
and outrage, this is what was on her mind[—]school, getting her son 
through school.”5    
Hannah-Jones began investigating the Normandy school 
district in Missouri, which Michael had attended. The optics were 
not great. “Each year, the Missouri Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education puts out a report that shows how each of its 
520 school districts is doing. It’s a numeric snapshot of the type of 
education students are receiving.”6  In 2014, Normandy received 
zero points in math, English, science, social studies, and college 
placement.7  The district received just 10 points out of the 140 points 
possible.8 Hannah-Jones describes these ten points as “points just 
for existing.”9   It is no surprise that the Normandy school district 
lost its accreditation.10 What is a surprise, however, is that this 
“event triggered a little-known Missouri law called the transfer 
law.”11 Under the transfer law, students in the Normandy school 
district had the option of staying at Normandy or busing into other, 
Whiter, districts.12 “Most [B]lack kids will not be shot by the police 
but many of them will go to a school like Michael Brown’s . . . almost 
completely [B]lack, almost completely poor, and failing badly.”13 
Normandy, Missouri, is not an outlier. Racial segregation in 
schools is not simply a problem of the South, reflecting old adages 
of political divides. Here in Minnesota, the largest school districts 
in the state are almost completely segregated.14 States all across the 
 
 4. This American Life, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. John Gordon, Teresa Nelson, William Z. Pentelovich & Jesse D. Mondry, 
Counterpoint: ‘Education Clause’ Lawsuit Simply Asks the Legislature to Do Its Duty, 
STAR TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2018, 5:59 PM), http://www.startribune.com/counterpoint-
education-clause-lawsuit-simply-asks-the-legislature-to-do-its-duty/497299441/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/XTS6-JK73] (“Minnesota has some of the worst achievement gaps in 
the country between [W]hite children and children of color. Our children of color are 
far behind their [W]hite peers, and segregated schools are part of the problem. Our 
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nation have been re-segregating, and much faster than they were 
ever desegregating.  In efforts to combat the inequalities of minority 
schools, “education finance litigation [has] traditionally [been] 
divided into three waves: federal equality litigation, state equality 
litigation, and state adequacy litigation.”15 In the past decade a 
fourth wave of education finance litigation has begun, seeking a 
federal adequacy right.16 The cruxes of these suits have asked: ‘Do 
minority schools have equal funding? Do they have adequate 
funding?’ These cases are seemingly unwilling to ask if racial 
segregation alone can create a poor education. 
Part I of this Note will provide background information, 
including: (1) social science that repeatedly links inequalities in 
education to lifelong barriers creating stress on the United States; 
(2) a brief history of the United States’ sordid relationship with 
school segregation; and (3) the four waves of litigation attempting 
to right past wrongs. Part II will introduce a current Minnesota case 
that asks if racial segregation alone can create an inadequate 
education. Part III will analyze other states’ responses to 
inequalities in public schools under the four waves framework. Part 
IV analyzes Minnesota’s civil rights legacy in context with current 
segregation lawsuits. Part V argues that for a remedy to come to 
fruition, the Minnesota Supreme Court will need to define what an 
adequate education encompasses and issue a desegregation order 
for the first time in almost fifty years. 
I. Background 
Inequalities in education have a rippling effect creating 
instability across the United States. Consequently, the United 
States addressed this issue more than a half a century ago, but poor 
enforcement has prevented any major progress. Litigation has 




country’s painful history has taught us that separate is not equal.”); Complaint at 9–
12, Cruz-Guzman v. State, No. 27-CV-1519117 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d, 892 N.W. 2d 
533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 916 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018) [hereinafter Cruz-
Guzman Complaint]. 
 15. Lauren Nicole Gillespie, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation: 
Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 991 
(2010). 
 16. Id. at 991, 1015. 
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A. Social Science Repeatedly Links Inequalities in 
Education to Lifelong Barriers. 
The effects of an inadequate education are costly, not just to 
the individual, but to the United States. In fact, it would be more 
expensive to leave education policy in its current form than to invest 
the time and resources into fixing it.17 Inadequate education 
negatively affects the economy and increases the costs of criminal 
justice and healthcare.18 These effects pervade society, creating an 
unstable environment. 
i. Inadequate and Segregated Education is a Costly 
Correlative to Criminal Justice. 
With an ever-increasing prison population, much of the 
country has called for criminal justice reform for two primary 
reasons: (1) over-incarceration for low-level drug offenses leads to 
recidivism and unstable family units, and (2) it is expensive.19 In 
2013, the “Council on Black Minnesotans found that state taxpayers 
spend more than $48,000 per prison inmate per year, just less than 
a year of tuition at Carleton College, the highest tuition in the 
state.”20 
Over two-thirds of men incarcerated in the United States have 
not completed high school.21 The two are no doubt correlated, but, if 
there is a causal relationship, which is the dependent variable? In 
other words, “do youth drop out of school because they want to sell 
drugs all day or do they sell drugs because they dropped out of 
 
 17. See Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, The Education Attainment Gap: 
Who’s Affected, How Much, and Why It Matters, in THE PRICE WE PAY 1, 2 (Clive R. 
Belfield et al. eds., 2007). (“[P]oor education leads to large public and social costs in 
the form of lower income and economic growth, reduced tax revenues, and higher 
costs of public services such as health care, criminal justice, and public assistance. 
Therefore we can view efforts to improve educational outcomes for at-risk 
populations as public investments that may yield benefits considerably in excess of 
investment costs.”) (emphasis added). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Enrico Moretti, Crime and the Costs of Criminal Justice, in THE PRICE WE 
PAY 142 (Clive R. Belfield et al. eds., 2007). 
 20. Brandt Williams, High School Dropouts Try to Get Back in the Game, MPR 
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2016, 12:05 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/03/07/
graduation-gap-dropout [https://perma.cc/RQ6H-BGHA]. 
 21. Kathryn Hanson & Deborah Stipek, Schools v. Prisons: Education’s the Way 
to Cut Prison Population, MERCURY NEWS (May 16, 2014), https://www.mercury
news.com/2014/05/15/schools-v-prisons-educations-the-way-to-cut-prison-populatio
n/ [https://perma.cc/9QKS-YYJW] (“Nationally, 68 percent of all males in prison do 
not have a high school diploma.”). 
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school?”22 Lochner23 suggests the latter, i.e., increased education 
leads to reduced propensity to engage in criminal activity,24 for four 
main reasons. First, education raises individual income, making 
crime and incarceration costlier for the individual.25 Second, 
education may directly affect how crime is perceived by the 
perpetrator, either positively or negatively.26 Third, education may 
increase an individual’s patience, lowering their propensity for 
risky behavior.27 Fourth, education affects “the social networks or 
peers of individuals” and Locher suggests that dropping out of 
school may introduce an individual to peers who exacerbate 
tendencies to engage in criminal activities.28 Further study 
coincides with Lochner’s assessment, revealing that “schooling 
significantly reduces criminal activity.”29 Furthermore, if dropout 
rates amongst men improved by just one percent,30 such 
improvement could save the United States “$1.4 billion per year in 
reduced costs from crime incurred by victims and by society at 
large.”31 
ii. Healthcare Expenditures Increase with Inadequate 
Education. 
Education has a large impact on a person’s health and in the 
aggregate has a large impact on the United States’ healthcare 
system.32 With more education comes higher incomes, more 
 
 22. Lance Lochner, Education and Crime, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
EDUCATION 5 (Penelope Peterson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008), https://economics
.uwo.ca/people/lochner_docs/educationandcrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4Q-Q4PJ]. 
 23. Lance Lochner is a professor of economics at the University of Western 
Ontario whose many publications address the cross-sections of crime, education, 
race, and poverty. Dep’t of Econ., Lance Lochner, W. UNIV. SOC. SCI., 
https://economics.uwo.ca/people/faculty/lochner.html [https://perma.cc/8N2T-8UJS].  
 24. Lochner, supra note 22, at 5 (“For most crimes (except, possibly, white collar 
crimes), one would expect these forces to induce a negative effect of schooling on 
crime.”).  
 25. Id. at 9. In other words, the more they gain, the more they have to lose. 
 26. See id. at 3 (“To the extent that schools ‘socialize’ students to become better 
citizens and to treat others better, education may also reduce the psychic returns to 
crime causing individuals to forego lucrative criminal opportunities.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 4–5 (“Youth who drop out of school may be influenced by a more 
negative set of peers, which may exacerbate any tendencies to engage in crime. 
Similarly, youth who join gangs or who otherwise engage in crime may be encouraged 
to leave school by their peers.”). 
 29. Moretti, supra note 19, at 157. 
 30. Id. (referring specifically to 1% of all men ages 20–60). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., CTR. ON SOC’Y & HEALTH, WHY EDUCATION 
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resources, social and psychological benefits, healthier behaviors, 
and healthier neighborhoods.33 The reverse is also true: “job 
insecurity, low wages, and lack of assets associated with less 
education can make individuals and families more vulnerable 
during hard times—which can lead to poor nutrition, unstable 
housing, and unmet medical needs.”34  One study found that 
individuals with the “lowest educational attainment exhibited the 
highest prevalence of risk factors” for cardiovascular disease.35 
Additionally, the Center on Society and Health found a negative 
correlation between education and “health-harming stresses.”36 The 
Center’s Director, Dr. Steve Woolf, stated, “only about ten percent 
of our health outcomes are determined by healthcare.”37 One of the 
initiatives at the Center is to “help people in the healthcare field 
understand the importance of education as a potential strategy for 






MATTERS TO HEALTH: EXPLORING THE CAUSES, 3–5 (Apr. 2014) [hereinafter VA 
COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION], https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/media/
society-health/pdf/test-folder/CSH-EHI-Issue-Brief-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TR2-Q7
93] (“Americans with more education live longer, healthier lives than those with 
fewer years of schooling.”). The Center on Society and Health began in 2007 and was 
chartered by the Board of Visitors at Virginia Commonwealth University. The 
Center is an “academic research center that studies health implications of social 
factors—such as education, income, neighborhood, and community environmental 
conditions, and public policy.” VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., CTR. ON SOC’Y & HEALTH, 
About Us, https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/about/ [https://perma.cc/G4N5-6QSC]. 
 33. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION, supra note 32, at 3–5.  
 34. Id. at 3. 
 35. Marilyn A. Winkleby et al., Socioeconomic Status and Health: How 
Education, Income, and Occupation Contribute to Risk Factors for Cardiovascular 
Disease, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 816, 817 (June 1992) (comparing education, 
occupation, and income as independent variable measures on cardiovascular 
disease); see also Peter Muennig, Consequences in Health Status and Costs, in THE 
PRICE WE PAY 128 (Clive R. Belfield et al. eds., 2007) (assessing the impact of 
education on mortality rates and government healthcare spending). 
 36. See id. at 4. 
 37. Va. Commonwealth Univ., Ctr. on Soc’y & Health, Why Education Matters to 
Health: Exploring the Causes, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://youtu.be
/V3rsdBBFAN8 [https://perma.cc/P4AR-KXP2] (quoting Dr. Steve Woolf, Director, 
VCU Center on Society and Health) (“If we really want to save lives in this country 
and prevent disease and reduce health care costs, we have to do something about 
education.”). 
 38. Id. 
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iii.  Persistent Achievement Gaps Will Destabilize the 
United States’ Economy. 
It is no surprise that the level of education a person receives is 
correlated to their income,39 with high school dropouts being in the 
bottom tier of income earners.40 As the United States continues to 
grow more diverse, these correlations may have new consequences. 
The 2020 projections by the Census Bureau reveal a “77 percent 
increase for the Hispanic population, a 32 percent increase for the 
African American, a 69 percent increase for the Asian population, 
and a less than 1 percent increase for the [W]hite population.”41 
Additionally, a study done in 2000 revealed: 
 
[B]lack and Hispanic students are less likely to get to twelfth 
grade; if they do, they are less likely to enroll in college; and if 
they do enroll, they are less likely to earn ten credits. Moreover, 
they are less likely to enroll in a B.A.-granting institution, and 
if they do, they are less likely to complete a degree.42 
 
These two statistics taken together mean that the United 
States is facing “significant growth in the population that has not 
even graduated high school.”43 These projections, continued through 
2050, reveal that “racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups that are 
overrepresented among low achievers and underrepresented among 
high achievers [will] make up the majority of the population and the 
workforce.”44 This growing population without high school 
 
 39. See Thomas Bailey, Implications of Educational Inequality in a Global 
Economy, in THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
INADEQUATE EDUCATION 76 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007) 
(“Reformers have linked education and economic growth for many years, predicting 
economic problems resulting from inadequate education.”).  
 40. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION, supra note 32, at 3 
(“[W]orkers with more education tend to earn more money. In 2012, the median wage 
for college graduates was more than twice that of high school dropouts and more 
than one-and-a-half times higher than that of high school graduates.”). 
 41. Bailey, supra note 39, at 89. The sources cited in this paper utilize the term 
Hispanic when referring to Latinx individuals. As such, the author uses the term 
Hispanic interchangeably with Latinx in order to avoid confusion with the language 
in the sources. 
 42. Id. at 87. 
 43. Id. at 89. 
 44. Ronald F. Ferguson, Toward Excellence with Equity: The Role of Parenting 
and Transformative School Reform, in THE PRICE WE PAY 225, 226 (Clive R. Belfield 
et al. eds., 2007) (“By 2050 racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups that are 
overrepresented among low achievers and underrepresented among high achievers 
will make up the majority of the population and the workforce.  Even more than 
today, technology and trade will pit workers head-to-head in competition with others 
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education translates to fewer skilled workers, greater health 
risks,45 higher taxes, and a less competitive economy globally.46 It 
is crucial that the United States takes steps now to close 
achievement gaps between races in order to correct this path. 
B. The United States Has Been Grappling with Inequalities 
in Education for over Sixty Years. 
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
opinion, wrote “Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.”47 Some well-meaning and some not-so-well-meaning 
school districts tried desegregating schools, but the experiment 
quickly failed. In 1955, Brown II cut the legs out from the previous 
decision with three simple words: “all deliberate speed.”48 Spoken 
by the Attorney General of the United States, these words 
proscribed remediation of segregation policies in a flexible window, 
deviating from the previous mandate and allowing state 
legislatures and school systems to delay and even curtail 
integration of public schools.49 Another decade would pass before 
the Supreme Court stated, “The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has 
run out.”50 
C. Four Waves of Litigation All Seek to Right Past Wrongs. 
While the country was still reeling from the effects of Brown I 
and Brown II, the first wave of education litigation began. The 
 
around the world.  The elderly will be more numerous. When young parents lack 
reading, math, and job skills to avoid poverty, they will compete with the elderly poor 
for public supports. Tax burdens on working-age adults are likely to be high.  
Meanwhile, internationally, the most elevated standards of living will obtain in 
nations where workers are most skilled and politics most stable. Where the United 
States will rank in this mix is uncertain.  It depends on us.  More than we might like 
to acknowledge, the social stability and vitality of the nation we leave our children 
depends fundamentally upon how relentlessly and effectively we pursue excellence 
with equity now and over the next several decades.”). 
 45. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION, supra note 32, at 2 
(“[P]eople with less education are more likely to work in high-risk occupations with 
few benefits.”). 
 46. See Bailey, supra note 39, at 76–79. 
 47. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Brown I is 
a hallmark of American law, representing some of the most deeply held values in our 
society, but the hope it prescribed remains an illusion. Accord Jim Chen, Poetic 
Justice, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 581–83 (2006). 
 48. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S.  300, 301 (1955). 
 49. See Chen, supra note 47, at 582–83, 588. 
 50. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). 
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Burger-led51 Supreme Court found that the United States 
Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly provides a 
fundamental right to an education.52 The Court held, “[T]he 
importance of a service performed by the State does not determine 
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of 
examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”53 This holding is 
directly adverse to Brown’s reasoning, putting an impetus on the 
importance of education when it held that separate facilities led to 
unequal educational opportunities.54 This decision foreclosed the 
possibility of bringing a federal equality of education lawsuit under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Consequently, future plaintiffs were left to bring these grievances 
through state constitutional claims. Unlike the United States 
Constitution, all fifty states’ constitutions have education clauses,55 
and the San Antonio decision opened the door to the second wave of 
education litigation.56 
The second wave of litigation mirrored that of San Antonio but 
focused on education clauses in state constitutions.57 For example, 
in Leandro v. State, plaintiffs sued the State of North Carolina and 
the State Board of Education, claiming a violation of the right to an 
“equal educational opportunit[y].”58 The North Carolina Supreme 
 
 51. Chief Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice Earl Warren and his decidedly 
activist tenure on the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger, a Minnesota native, was 
nominated by President Nixon and ushered in a new conservative era. Warren E. 
Burger: U.S. Supreme Court Justice: Overview, MINN. HISTORY CTR., GALE FAMILY 
LIBRARY, https://libguides.mnhs.org/burger [https://perma.cc/6NAX-VDJT]. 
 52. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1973). 
 53. Id. at 30. 
 54. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 55. Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution Education Clause Language, EDUC. 
JUSTICE, http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/State%20Constitution%20Ed
ucation%20Clause%20Language.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT87-MDMK]; Emily Parker, 
Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES 
(Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligati
ons-for-public-education-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DJW-VRKC]. 
 56. See Catharine Hansard, Searching for the Missing Piece: An Examination of 
the Constitutional Language in Texas’s Education Clause that Continues to Fuel the 
Puzzling School Finance Saga, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. ONLINE EDITION 1, 2 n.7 (2016) 
(“While the Supreme Court of the United States declined to recognize education as a 
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, every state constitution contains an education clause, and all states 
require children to enroll in school with the ultimate goal of preparing students to 
graduate from high school ready to attend college.”). 
 57. See Gillespie, supra note 15, at 998 (“Litigants in the earliest state court suits 
continued to make an equality-based argument, now grounded in the equal 
protection clauses of various state constitutions.”). 
 58. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1997); see infra notes 106–108; 
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Court found that there was nothing in the state’s constitution to 
mandate equal funding,59 but did find there was a qualitative 
component mandating a “sound basic education.”60 On the other 
hand, in Texas, the state supreme court found that the financing 
scheme created unequal access to educational materials violating 
the state’s constitution.61 The second wave of education was met 
with varied success for plaintiffs. With more courts willing to define 
adequacy or, in Leandro’s case a “sound basic education,” a third 
wave of litigation began. 
The third wave was comprised of state adequacy litigation 
lawsuits, which were premised on qualitative components that 
articulated the type of education state constitutions prescribed. For 
example, in Kentucky, plaintiffs sued claiming the state financing 
system failed to provide adequate educations to all students.62 The 
state supreme court decisively found in favor of plaintiffs stating, 
“A child’s right to an adequate education is a fundamental one 
under our Constitution.”63 The court then defined ‘adequate’ using 
seven criteria that the state had to provide to fulfill its obligation 
under the Kentucky Constitution.64 Similarly, in Kansas, the state 
supreme court found that the legislature had violated the state 
constitution, as its financing scheme failed to provide adequate 
education for all students.65 Unlike Kentucky, the Kansas 
legislature has grappled with this ruling for a decade, and remains 
in noncompliance with the court’s mandate.66 Adequacy lawsuits 
sidestepped the issue of equality, but, like the second wave of 
lawsuits, they sought resolution through state financing. 
The new fourth wave of education litigation seeks what the 
San Antonio decision left many thinking was impossible: a federal 
 
see also infra note 106 at 342. 
 59. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 256–57 (“[W]e see no reason to suspect that the 
framers intended that substantially equal educational opportunities beyond the 
sound basic education mandated by the Constitution must be available in all 
districts. A constitutional requirement to provide substantial equality of educational 
opportunities in every one of the various school districts of the state would almost 
certainly ensure that no matter how much money was spent on the schools of the 
state, at any given time some of those districts would be out of compliance.”). 
 60. Id. at 254–55. 
 61. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). But see 
infra notes 135–141 and accompanying text. 
 62. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989). 
 63. Id. at 212. 
 64. Id. at 212–13; see infra notes 149–162 and accompanying text. 
 65. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1239 (Kan. 2014). 
 66. See infra notes 163–171 and accompanying text. 
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right to an adequate education. This wave differs from the first 
wave because the crux is not equality of education, but adequacy.  
For example, in Michigan a group of high-school students sought a 
federal right to literacy.67 The court ultimately dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice, holding the state was not required to 
provide a minimally adequate level of education, nor was there a 
fundamental right to literacy under the United States 
Constitution.68  While this outcome left some disheartened, many 
believe there is a groundswell of opinion and precedent to find a 
federal right to an adequate education in the near future.69 
These four waves of litigation highlight the inequalities of 
education and each seeks a change in financing schemes. After sixty 
years of lawsuits, however, is financing really the answer? 
Minnesota’s most urban school districts, Minneapolis and St. Paul, 
are receiving more funding than any other district in the state.70 
Yet their students are falling far behind their suburban 
counterparts.71 Nikole Hannah-Jones has investigated school 
districts across the United States, all parroting the same new 
strategies: magnet programs, earning college credit in high school, 
improving teacher quality, replacing principals, and implementing 
more testing.72 She said, “[Y]ou could take these conversations and 
go from district to district to district, and you will always hear the 
same things.”73 All these solutions are financing-based resolutions, 
and none have effectively reduced the achievement gap between 
 
 67. Gary v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 2018) superseded 
by, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (stating plaintiffs alleged they were denied 
the right of access to literacy under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the United States Constitution). 
 68. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 366; see infra notes 177–193 and accompanying 
text. 
 69. See Gillespie, supra note 15 at 1010 (“[T]he Court has supported students’ 
receipt of a meaningful educational opportunity and shown a willingness to consider 
and articulate the features that contribute to an adequate education.”). 
 70. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. 1993) (explaining the higher 
property tax rate of commercial entities going towards Minneapolis and St. Paul 
schools); see also Megan Burks, Minnesota’s School Funding Formula Provides Some 
Students of Color Less than Their White Peers, MPR NEWS (Mar. 5, 2019, 5:56 PM), 
https://www.mprnews.org/listen?name=/minnesota/news/features/2019/03/05/school
_funding_20190305_128.mp3 [https://perma.cc/EJ77-QN9N] (“Overall, Minnesota 
districts with mostly students of color receive 8 percent more funding than 
predominantly white districts . . . .”). 
 71. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 20. 
 72. This American Life, supra note 2. 
 73. Id. 
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White and minority students.74 In her research, Hannah-Jones 
found “one thing that really worked, that cut the achievement gap 
between black and white students by half. . . . But it’s the one thing 
that we are not really talking about, and that very few places are 
doing anymore . . . [i]ntegration.”75 
II. Cruz-Guzman v. State Seeks Injunction to State 
Sponsored Segregation. 
On November 5, 2015, seven individuals76 and one non-profit 
organization77 sued the state of Minnesota,78 claiming the state had 
perpetuated a pattern of discrimination among its school systems, 
resulting in segregated institutions and inadequate educations. The 
complaint alleged violations of the equal protection,79 due process,80 
and education81 clauses of the Minnesota Constitution, resulting in 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Plaintiffs are Alejandro Cruz-Guzman, guardian and next friend of his three 
minor children, who attend St. Paul schools; Me’Lea Connolly, guardian and next 
friend of her three minor children, who attend Minneapolis schools; Ke’Aundra 
Johnson, guardian and next friend of her minor child, who attends a Minneapolis 
school; Izreal Muhammad, guardian and next friend of his two minor children, who 
attend a Northern suburb school; Roxxanne O’Brien, guardian and next friend of her 
two minor children, who attend a Hawthorne neighborhood school in Minneapolis; 
Diwin O’Neal Daley, as guardian and next friend of his two minor children, who 
attend a Seward neighborhood school in Minneapolis; and Lawrence Lee, as 
guardian and next friend of his two minor children, who attend a Saint Paul school. 
Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 77. One Family One Community is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation whose 
purpose is to ensure and provide for adequate educational opportunities for 
economically-disadvantaged children and children of color. Cruz-Guzman 
Complaint, supra note 14, at 5. 
 78. The Defendants collectively referred to as “the State” were originally 
comprised of the State of Minnesota; Minnesota Department of Education; Dr. 
Brenda Cassellius, Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Education; Mark 
Dayton, Governor of Minnesota; Minnesota Senate; Sandra L. Pappas, President of 
the Minnesota Senate; Minnesota House of Representatives; and Kurt Daudt, 
Speaker of the Minnesota House of Representatives. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra 
note 14, at 5–7. But see Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5 n.2 (Minn. 2018) 
(“The district court dismissed Governor Dayton from this suit based on separation-
of-powers concerns. The district court also dismissed the two individual legislators, 
concluding that they are ‘immune in this suit’ under the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. IV, § 10.  The dismissal of these 
defendants is not at issue in this appeal.”). 
 79. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No member of this state shall be disfranchised or 
deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by 
the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”). 
 80. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.”). 
 81. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government 
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de jure and de facto segregation82 across Minnesota schools.83 
Additionally, the complaint brought claims under the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act84 for “unlawful discrimination in education on 
the basis of race and status.”85 The state contended the complaint 
should be dismissed “on multiple grounds, including lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, and failure to join all interested persons.”86 The district 
court dismissed the Human Rights Act claims87 brought against 
three defendants on the ground of legislative immunity,88 but 
denied the state’s motion in all other respects. The state then 
appealed, claiming the district court erred in four separate ways: 
(1) by refusing to dismiss the claims against the Minnesota Senate 
 
depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature 
to establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall 
make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient 
system of public schools throughout the state.”). 
 82. See Segregation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining de facto 
segregation as “[s]egregation that occurs without state authority, usu. on the basis 
of socioeconomic factors” and de jure segregation as “[s]egregation that is permitted 
by law.”); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1411–
12 (Choper et al. eds., 12th ed. 2015) (“[I]ntentional (or ‘de jure’) discrimination may 
exist even though the law in question is racially ‘neutral’ on its face: the law may be 
deliberately administered in a discriminatory way; or the law, although neutral in 
its language and applied in accordance with its terms, may have been enacted with 
a purpose (or motive) of disadvantaging a ‘suspect’ class.”). Compare Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding the enforced separation of the races is a 
legitimate exercise of each state’s police power), abrogated by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 438, 494–95 (1954) (“Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this 
finding is rejected . . . . We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine 
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”), with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) 
(holding San Francisco municipal code, though facially neutral, served to 
discriminate against Chinese laundromat owners), and Keyes v. School Dist., 413 
U.S. 189 (1973) (holding that school boards cannot rely on racially neutral 
explanations when defending accusations that segregated schools are the result of 
intentional segregation, rather than “racially neutral” policies). 
 83. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 28–33. 
 84. Minn. Human Rights Act § 363A.13, subd. 1 (“It is an unfair discriminatory 
practice to discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of or benefit from any 
educational institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person because of 
race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, status with 
regard to public assistance, sexual orientation, or disability . . . .”). 
 85. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 2. 
 86. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). 
 87. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“The 
district court also dismissed respondents’ claim under the Minnesota Human Rights 
Act, concluding that respondents lacked standing.”). 
 88. Id. (“The district court dismissed the complaint as to Governor Dayton, 
Senate President Pappas, and Speaker Daudt, concluding that they are entitled to 
legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota 
Constitution.”). 
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and House of Representatives on legislative immunity grounds;89 
(2) by refusing to dismiss the complaint in its entirety due to a 
nonjusticiable political question;90 (3) by refusing to dismiss the 
complaint because of a failure to join all interested parties;91 and (4) 
by refusing to dismiss the complaint because the state of Minnesota 
is “not a proper party defendant.”92 Judge Larkin of the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals held for the State, finding the complaint brought 
a nonjusticiable political question. Because this finding was 
dispositive, the court did not reach the state’s other contentions.93 
The plaintiffs then sought review by the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
and the state sought cross-review for further clarification on the 
issues not addressed by the appellate court, including legislative 
immunity and proper joinder of parties.94 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court granted the petitions for review and cross-review and 
ultimately reversed the appellate court’s holding, finding that the 
plaintiffs’ claims under the due process, equal protection, and 
education clauses of the Minnesota Constitution were justiciable.95 
Additionally, the court found that the Minnesota Senate and House 
of Representatives were not entitled to immunity, nor did the suit 
require the joinder of other interested parties.96 
In Cruz-Guzman v. State the court was set to determine the 
fate of all segregation and adequacy in education lawsuits while 
navigating the tumultuous waters of the separation of powers 
doctrine. If the court shied away from its decision here and held, as 
the appellate court did, that the plaintiffs’ claims were 
nonjusticiable, the legal remedy to state sponsored segregation of 
primary and secondary schools would be nonexistent. In addressing 
the justiciability question, the court stated, “Deciding that 
appellants’ claims are not justiciable would effectively hold that the 
judiciary cannot rule on the Legislature’s noncompliance with a 
constitutional mandate, which would leave Education Clause 
claims without a remedy.”97 Consequently, the court did not intend 
to step into the legislature’s shoes and determine education policy, 
 
 89. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W. 2d at 12–13. 
 90. Id. at 7–10. 
 91. Id. at 13–15. 
 92. Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 536. 
 93. Id. at 541; Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 6. 
 94. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 7. 
 95. Id. at 1. 
 96. Id. at 13–14. 
 97. Id. at 9. 
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rather, it intended to operate as a check and balance on the 
legislature’s duty to fulfill the mandate given to it by the Minnesota 
Constitution.98 Additionally, the court held that the joinder of school 
districts and charter schools was not necessary to pursue the 
litigation.99 This decision is important because the court effectively 
held the state responsible for the adequacy of educating Minnesota’s 
students—adequacy which, the complaint alleges, is failing due to 
hyper-segregated schools throughout the Minneapolis and St. Paul 
areas.100 If, as the state purported, the school districts and charter 
schools were deemed necessary parties, the state could deflect 
blame onto particular school policies and avoid its responsibility for 
rolling back desegregation efforts and implementing new 
segregative measures.101 The court was not asked to rule on 
whether the state had violated the equal protection, due process, 
and education clauses of the Minnesota Constitution, but because 
of the court’s strong and decisive ruling on the fundamental issues 
above, plaintiffs are now able to pursue their claims in district 
court. 
III. There Is No Remedy to Segregated Schools Except 
Integration. 
The four waves of education litigation all seek to remedy the 
achievement gap between White and minority students, but all 
hesitate to point the finger directly at segregation. The second and 
third waves focus on state financing schemes, after the San Antonio 
decision knocked down a federal right to education.102 The fourth 
wave returns to the United States Constitution, this time seeking a 
 
 98. Id. at 8–9 (“In fact, the Education Clause is the only section of the Minnesota 
Constitution that imposes an explicit ‘duty’ on the Legislature.”). 
 99. Id. at 14.  
 100. The plaintiffs detail in their complaint that “children of color comprise only 
approximately 29 percent of Minnesota’s public school population,” but Minneapolis 
schools are comprised of “66 percent children of color” and St. Paul schools are 
comprised of “78 percent of children of color.” In fact, twenty-seven Minneapolis 
schools have populations of at least 80% children of color, and in St. Paul, thirty 
schools have populations of at least 85% children of color. Meanwhile charter schools 
are operating almost entirely on racially segregated grounds. Forty-two charter 
schools in Minneapolis and St. Paul have populations over 95% children of color, and 
twenty-seven charter schools have populations over 80% White children. The 
complaint contrasts these numbers of hyper-segregated schools in Minneapolis and 
St. Paul with the neighboring suburbs, expounding on graduation and employment 
rates stemming from segregated versus non-segregated schools. Cruz-Guzman 
Complaint, supra note 14, at 7–15. 
 101. See infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. 
 102. Supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
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right to adequate teachers, facilities, and resources as opposed to 
equality.103 With mixed results, education litigation has, thus far, 
left minority Americans on shaky ground. 
A. Second Wave: Equality in State Financing Leads to 
Decades of Litigation with Little Change for Students. 
The Supreme Courts of North Carolina and Texas reached 
opposite conclusions when equality was sought under their 
respective state constitutions. The North Carolina Supreme Court 
found nothing in the state’s constitution that mandated the equal 
financing of schools,104 whereas the Texas Supreme Court found the 
state’s financing scheme created unequal access to educational 
materials in violation of the state’s constitution.105 
i. North Carolina Struggles with Decades of Litigation 
Where Equal Financing is Not Required by State 
Constitution. 
In 1997, in Raleigh, North Carolina, the state supreme court 
held that two provisions of the state constitution “combine to 
guarantee every child . . . an opportunity to receive a sound basic 
education in . . . public schools.”106 In Leandro v. State,107 the court 
further itemized particular factors that create a “sound basic 
education,” including the ability to read, write, speak English, and 
having sufficient knowledge of mathematics, science, history, 
geography, economics, politics, and vocational skills.108 Seven years 
later, as the legislature struggled to implement a funding system 
sufficient to accomplish these goals, the court again reviewed the 
issue, this time holding that the state’s new funding scheme did not 
appropriately identify and fund “at-risk”109 students as to provide 
them an opportunity to a “sound basic education.”110 The court also 
took the opportunity to applaud the trial court’s judicial restraint 
by stating the court did not “dictate how existing problems should 
 
 103. Complaint at 24–25, Gary v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852 (E.D. Mich. 2018), 
superseded by, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018) [hereinafter Snyder 
Complaint]. 
 104. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256 (N.C. 1997). 
 105. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). 
 106. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 391–96 (N.C. 2004). 
 110. Id. at 390. 
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be approached and resolved . . . [r]ecognizing that education 
concerns were the shared province of the legislative and executive 
branches . . . .”111 Despite the progress, subsequent litigation has 
lasted over two decades. 
In 2012, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed a 
trial court’s decision to order the unrestricted admission of “at-risk” 
four-year-olds into existing pre-kindergarten programs.112 A year 
later this decision was dismissed and the appeal vacated because of 
the legislature’s amendments to the pre-kindergarten program.113 
Then in 2017, both parties to the on-going saga jointly requested an 
independent consultant be appointed by the court.114 This 
consultant would work with the newly appointed Governor’s 
Commission on Access to Sound Basic Education to “assist in the 
development of a comprehensive plan to address compliance with 
the constitutional mandates set forth in [Leandro]” and “develop 
specific recommendations as to the means to achieve such 
compliance.”115 Most recently, Judge David Lee denied a motion 
from the State Board of Education asking to be dismissed from the 
case. He stated in part: 
 
There is an ongoing constitutional violation of every child’s 
right to receive the opportunity for a sound basic education. 
This court not only has the power to hear and enter appropriate 
orders declaratory and remedial in nature, but also has a duty 
to address this violation. This court retains both subject matter 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties as it undertakes 
this duty. Both state defendants have been proper parties to 
this litigation since its inception and each remain so.116 
 
 
 111. Id. at 391. 
 112. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 731 S.E.2d 691, 698 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2012), vacated, 749 S.E.2d 451 (N.C. 2013). 
 113. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 749 S.E.2d 451, 454–55 (N.C. 2013). 
 114. North Carolina Litigation Map, SCHOOLFUNDING: A PROJECT OF THE CTR. 
FOR EDUC. EQUITY AT TEACHERS COLL. (2019), http://schoolfunding.info/litigation-
map/north-carolina/#1484027095865-59c41679-8ab6 [https://perma.cc/4ZTS-9EME
]. 
 115. Joint Motion for a Case Management and Scheduling Order at 4, Hoke Cty. 
Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95 CVS 1158 (Wake County Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2018), 
http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/N.Carolina-Joint-Motion-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5YH-QELP]. 
 116. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 6 (Wake County 
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2018), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
Leandro-order-denying-SBE-motion-.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU8Q-QGZ7] (emphasis 
in original). 
 
182 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38: 1 
The judge’s finite words make clear this case is going nowhere; 
neither, apparently, are the state’s education woes. In 2014, the 
Charlotte Observer reported that North Carolina is still struggling 
to effectively address failing schools, and nearly 56% of students are 
“at risk of academic failure.”117 
One response to the ongoing educational dispute is the 
utilization of charter schools. Charter schools began in North 
Carolina in 1997 as a compromise between Republican and 
Democrat leaders. Both parties wanted to avoid vouchers to private 
schools that could potentially further disadvantage minority 
students.118 The early requirements of charter schools in North 
Carolina reflected a concern for racial imbalance. Some 
requirements included a “racial and ethnic mix” that reflected “the 
community in which it [was] located,”119 preference to at-risk 
children,120 and transportation plans “so that transportation would 
not be a barrier to any student who lived within the district of the 
charter school.”121 Early in the charter school experiment, the 
percentage of minority enrollees was higher than that of the 
traditional public schools, but over time that trend began to 
change.122 As more White students entered charter schools and the 
amount of charter schools tripled,123 racial imbalance began to 
grow. Soon, minority students made up an even smaller portion of 
charter schools than traditional public schools.124 
 
 117. Jane Stancill, Too Many NC Children Aren’t Receiving Adequate Education, 
Court Filings Say, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 9, 2014, 6:17 AM), https://www.
charlotteobserver.com/news/local/education/article9120011.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DK2-54EE]. 
 118. Helen F. Ladd, et al., The Growing Segmentation of the Charter School Sector 
in North Carolina 4 (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 133, Aug. 2015), https://caldercenter.org/sites/default/
files/WP%20133_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9DN-RJAZ]. 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. Id. (“[T]he State Board of Education was encouraged to give preference to 
applications that demonstrated the capability of serving students at risk of academic 
failure.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 6–7. 
 123. Id. at 6. 
 124. Id. at 7; see also Valerie Strauss, The Myth of ‘School Choice’ in North 
Carolina, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018 8:19 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/08/10/the-myth-of-school-choice-in-north-carolina/?ut
m_term=.338f9a8c605c [https://perma.cc/NJ3F-EXXP] (“If our state legislators are 
really serious about providing families with good choices, they must enact policies 
that move us in the direction of racial and economic integration.”). 
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The achievement of charter schools followed a similar trend. 
In the early years, many charter school students were being 
outperformed by their public school peers, but by 2012 this flipped 
with charter school students outperforming public school students 
at every grade level.125 One analysis explains that achievement rose 
where there was a higher return rate of students, and the schools 
with higher return rates had a greater percentage of White students 
than minority students.126 It concluded that: 
 
[T]he apparent gains in the test scores of charter school 
students over time have far more to do with selection than with 
the quality of the programs they offer. Taken together, our 
findings imply that the charter schools in North Carolina have 
become segmented over time, with one segment increasingly 
serving the interests of middle class [sic] [W]hite families.127 
ii. Texas Finds Funding System Unequal but Refuses to 
Draw a Cost-Quality Relationship. 
Texas has been grappling with school finance lawsuits since 
the mid-1980s. In Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 
the Texas Supreme Court found that the school financing system 
was unconstitutional because it was neither “financially efficient” 
nor did it provide for a “general diffusion of knowledge” as required 
by the Texas Constitution.128 “A general diffusion of knowledge 
being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the 
people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to 
establish and make suitable provision for the support and 
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.”129 Here, 
the financing system, which relied on 42% of funding from the state 
and 50% from independent districts, left a disparity of 700 to 1 
because of the vast differences in the ability of school districts to 
garner funds from property taxes.130 The court found that despite 
the efforts of the legislature,131 this scheme was unconstitutional 
 
 125. Ladd et al., supra note 118, at 9, 19–20. 
 126. Id. at 15, 34–36. 
 127. Id. at 26. 
 128. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). 
 129. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 130. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 392. 
 131. Id. at 397 (“By statutory directives, the legislature has attempted through 
the years to reduce disparities and improve the system . . . . The legislature’s recent 
efforts have focused primarily on increasing the state’s contributions. More money 
allocated under the present system would reduce some of the existing disparities 
between districts but would at best only postpone the reform that is necessary to 
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and inefficient.132 “Efficiency does not require a per capita 
distribution, but it also does not allow concentrations of resources 
in property-rich school districts that are taxing low when property-
poor districts that are taxing high cannot generate sufficient 
revenues to meet even minimum standards.”133 The court 
elaborated that “districts must have substantially equal access to 
similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.”134 
Essentially, the legislature had to work with the individual school 
districts to devise a way for all students to have equal access to 
education materials while refraining from hiking up property taxes 
in poorer districts.135 
Sixteen years later, the defendants in Neeley v. West Orange-
Cove Consolidated Independent School District, claimed the 
judiciary’s intrusion on school finance matters in Edgewood left the 
legislature and schools on shaky ground, stating “issues of 
adequacy, suitability, and efficiency under article VII, section 1 are 
all nonjusticiable political questions . . . .”136 The court rejected 
these claims, doubling-down on its ruling in Edgewood that the 
judiciary is well-equipped to decide whether the legislature has met 
its constitutional duty of supplying an adequate education.137 
Furthermore, the court found that the public school financing 
system was adequate,138 but that the state’s control of local taxation 
for education amounts to a state property tax in violation139 of the 
state constitution.140 The state legislature was once again back at 
 
make the system efficient. A band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be 
changed.”). 
 132. Id. at 399 (“Although we have ruled the school financing system to be 
unconstitutional, we do not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the 
legislation it should enact; nor do we order it to raise taxes. The legislature has 
primary responsibility to decide how best to achieve an efficient system.”). 
 133. Id. at 397. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 777 
(Tex. 2005). 
 137. Id. at 778–79 (“The judiciary is well-accustomed to applying substantive 
standards the crux of which is reasonableness . . . . Litigation over the adequacy of 
public education may well invite judicial policy-making, but the invitation need not 
be accepted.”). 
 138. Id. at 792–94. 
 139. Id. at 795 (“[A]n ad valorem tax is a state tax . . . when the State so 
completely controls the levy, assessment and disbursement of revenue, either 
directly or indirectly, that the authority employed is without meaningful discretion.”) 
(quoting Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 
826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1992)). 
 140. See TEX. CONST. art. 8, § 1(e) (abolishing ad valorem property taxes). 
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the drawing board to devise “structural changes” to the public 
education system to provide adequate and equal access to 
education.141 
Most recently in Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness 
Coalition, the Texas Supreme Court found, “[d]espite the 
imperfections of the current school funding regime, it meets 
minimum constitutional requirements.”142 In a 100-page opinion, 
the court found the Texas public school system met both the 
financial143 and qualitative efficiency requirements;144 students’ 
achievement satisfied the “general diffusion of knowledge” 
requirement;145 and such requirement did not require adequate 
funding.146 The court echoed the sentiments of San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,  stating, “[t]o determine 
as a matter of fact that specific funding levels are required to 
achieve the constitutional threshold of a general diffusion of 
knowledge, a court not only must find that a cost-quality 
relationship exists, but also must assign specific quantitative 
measures to that relationship.”147 While the court again rejected the 
state’s claims that the political question doctrine prevented the 
court from assessing the state’s educational system,148 its broad 
ruling on school financing makes a future claim seem unpromising. 
B. Third Wave: State Adequacy Lawsuits Have Mixed 
Results. 
The supreme courts of Kentucky and Kansas have both held 
that their respective state has failed to provide adequate education 
for students, but the legislatures have differed greatly on how to 
implement changes. The Kentucky Supreme Court uses qualitative 
criteria to define “adequacy” giving the legislature a roadmap for 
the necessary changes. Whereas the Kansas Supreme Court relied 
on the already robust state constitution to hold the legislature in 
non-compliance for almost a decade. 
 
 141. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 800. 
 142. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 
2016). 
 143. See id. at 876. 
 144. Id. at 878–79. 
 145. Id. at 868. 
 146. See id. at 850–51. 
 147. Id. at 851. 
 148. Id. at 846. 
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i. Kentucky Leads the Way in Adequacy Lawsuits 
Through Developing A Strong Definition with 
Qualitative Criteria. 
Kentucky sets the standard for adequacy in education 
lawsuits. In the late-1980s, a group of plaintiffs brought a 
declaratory judgment action claiming the school financing system 
is inadequate and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection, 
Due Process, and Education Clauses of the Kentucky 
Constitution.149 The Education Clause in Kentucky is quite trimmer 
than that of Kansas, stating in full: “The General Assembly shall, 
by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of 
common schools throughout the State.”150 Here, the legislature also 
fought back relying on the separation of powers doctrine, claiming 
the question was purely political.151 The court rejected this claim,152 
and in a decisive manner set forth a definition for an “efficient 
system of education.”153 
 
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to 
provide each and every child with at least the seven following 
capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills 
to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly 
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, 
social, and political systems to enable the student to make 
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that 
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient 
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical 
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each 
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; 
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in 
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to 
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient 
levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school 
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in 
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.154 
 
 
 149. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190–91 (Ky. 1989). 
 150. KY. CONST. § 183. 
 151. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 191. 
 152. Id. at 208–09. 
 153. Id. at 212. 
 154. Id. 
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In response to this audacious standard, the legislature enacted 
education reforms that increased school funding dramatically.155 
The legislature’s quick and faithful response156 to the Rose decision 
not only benefitted Kentucky students and teachers, but also acted 
as a shield in later litigation.157 The seven Rose factors have been 
adopted by five other states: Alabama, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, and Kansas.158 
The carefully crafted definition of adequate has improved 
student “output measures,”159 but has failed to close achievement 
gaps between White and minority students. Thirty years after Rose, 
“achievement gaps between student populations continue to be 
incredibly disturbing.”160 The 2017–2018 student assessment 
results from the Kentucky Department of Education measured 
White students nearly doubling Black students in “transition 
readiness”161 and significantly outweighing Hispanic students.162 
The gold standard of third wave education litigation has still failed 





 155. See Kentucky Litigation Map, SCHOOLFUNDING: A PROJECT OF THE CTR. FOR 
EDUC. EQUITY TEACHERS COLL., http://schoolfunding.info/litigation-map/kentucky
/#1484023070798-ae032cc2-e640 [https://perma.cc/B4GG-3YYQ]. 
 156. See Susan Perkins Weston & Robert F. Sexton, Substantial and Yet Not 
Sufficient: Kentucky’s Effort to Build Proficiency for Each and Every Child, EDUC., 
EQUITY, & LAW, Dec. 2009, at 9. 
 157. In later litigation, a Kentucky district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim that 
funding was inadequate, finding that “output measures indicate that Kentucky is 
making substantial progress toward its education goals” and that plaintiffs failed to 
show actual, objective inadequacy. Id. at 20–22. 
 158. See Catharine Hansard, Searching for the Missing Piece: An Examination of 
the Constitutional Language in Texas’s Education Clause That Continues to Fuel the 
Puzzling School Finance Saga, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. ONLINE EDITION 1, 8 n.49 
(2016). 
 159. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 868 (Tex. 
2016). 
 160. See Wayne Lewis et al., Achievement Remains Flat, Gaps Persist in Kentucky 
Schools, KY. TCHR., (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.kentuckyteacher.org/news/2018
/09/achievement-remains-flat-gaps-persist-in-kentucky-schools/ 
[https://perma.cc/9RWV-KH56]. 
 161. Id. (“[T]ransition-ready — prepared with knowledge, skills and essential 
dispositions to succeed in the next educational setting or career pathway. Students 
ready for the next level are transition ready.”). 
 162. Id. (demonstrating that 65% of White students are transition ready, whereas 
only 32% of Black students and 44% of Hispanic students have been designated 
transition ready by the Kentucky Department of Education). 
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ii. Kansas Legislature and Supreme Court Continue to 
Duel Over Adequacy Requirements.  
In November 2010, thirty-nine plaintiffs filed a complaint in 
the Kansas district court alleging the state of Kansas grossly 
underfunded education in direct violation of the state 
constitution.163 Kansas has one of the more robust education 
clauses, stating in part, “The legislature shall provide for 
intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by 
establishing and maintaining public schools . . . .”164 This clause 
means, “[t]he Kansas Constitution . . . imposes a mandate that our 
educational system cannot be static or regressive but must be one 
which ‘advance[s] to a better quality or state.’”165 Plaintiffs’ 
complaint details the legislature’s continuous failure to meet this 
high bar by surreptitiously cutting funding and bleeding Kansas’s 
education budget.166 The Kansas Supreme Court has issued seven 
opinions in Gannon v. State, most recently in June of 2019.167 The 
court revisited the case after the “legislative passage of 2019 House 
 
 163. KAN. CONST., art. VI, § 6(b) (“The legislature shall make suitable provision 
for finance of the educational interests of the state . . . .”); Complaint at 17–18, 
Gannon v. State, No. 10C1569, 2013 WL 146092 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013), rev’d, 
298 Kan. 1107 (2014). 
 164. KAN. CONST., art. VI, §1. 
 165. Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 309, supplemented, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005) 
(quoting Improve, in WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 557 (1999)). 
 166. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1213–14 (Kan. 2014). 
 167. Gannon v. State, 309 Kan. 1185, 1201 (2019) (finding the State’s legislature 
in substantial compliance with previous judicial mandates.); Gannon v. State, 443 
P.3d 294, 304 (Kan. 2018) (finding the state’s legislature in substantial compliance 
with previous judicial mandates); Gannon v. State, 420 P.3d 477, 488 (Kan. 2018) 
(holding the state’s remediation plan “with some financial adjustments” could “bring 
the K-12 system into compliance with the adequacy requirement in Article 6 of the 
Kansas Constitution.”); Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513, 525 (Kan. 2017) (holding the 
state again failed to meet its burden to show compliance with “this remedy phase” of 
the litigation, but also failed to show its work towards compliance); Gannon v. State, 
390 P.3d 461, 488 (Kan. 2017) (holding the CLASS finance system acted as a “stopgap 
and merely freeze[s] the K–12 funding levels for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 at the 
levels for fiscal year 2015.”); Gannon v. State, 372 P.3d 1181, 1187 (Kan. 2016) 
(holding, while H.B. 2655  corrected funding regarding the unconstitutional 
inequalities of the capital outlay, other portions of the funding bill remained 
unconstitutional); Gannon v. State, 368 P.3d 1024, 1026 (Kan. 2016) (holding the 
state failed to demonstrate that it had cured the unconstitutional inequalities of the 
capital outlay, and failed to provide supplemental general state aid in an amount 
that would allow “aid-receiving districts to provide substantially similar educational 
opportunities through tax efforts similar to their wealthier counterparts.”); Gannon 
v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236–37 (Kan. 2014) (holding that the adequacy requirement 
in the education clause would be met if the financing system was “reasonably 
calculated to have all Kansas public education students meet or exceed the standards 
set out in Rose and presently codified in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72-1127.”). 
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Substitute for Senate Bill 16 (S.B. 16), which the Governor signed 
into law on April 6, 2019.”168 The court found that the new 
legislation addressed their lingering concerns from 2018, when the 
court stated, “with some financial adjustments” the legislature’s 
current bill could satisfy the constitutional mandate.169 S.B. 16 
added approximately $90 million to education each year from 2019 
to 2023, specifically addressing inflation and virtual school state 
aid.170 However, the court retained jurisdiction over the case “to 
ensure continued implementation of the scheduled funding”171 
(citing specifically to a 2018 “legislative attempt to reclaim 
educational funds . . . .”).172 
In April 2018, the Kansas House Judiciary Committee 
“narrowly advanced a measure that would declare ‘the power to 
establish adequacy of financing for education as exclusively within 
the legislative power of the state.’”173 Essentially, this measure 
attempts to prevent the court from evaluating the legislature’s 
compliance with the financing section of the Education Clause of 
the Kansas Constitution, by amending the state’s constitution.174 As 
Senator Julia Lynn stated, “I think as long as we let this go on, as 
long as we let the court push us around and come over and do our 
jobs, th[ere] . . . will never be enough money.”175 This aggressive 
measure did not make it to the ballot in November 2018, but the 
court clearly deemed it a continuous threat to the litigation as the 
Kansas legislature grounded their rebellion in the separation of 
 
 168. Gannon, 309 Kan. 1185, 1186 (2019). 
 169. Gannon, 420 P.3d at 488 (holding the State’s remediation plan “with some 
financial adjustments” could “bring the K-12 system into compliance with the 
adequacy requirement in Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution.”). 
 170. Gannon, 309 Kan. at 1193–98. 
 171. Id. at 1201. Plaintiffs pointed to an attempt by the legislature to reclaim 
educational funding during the 2018 session as support for their argument that the 
court should retain jurisdiction.  
 172.  Id.  
 173. Hunter Woodall, Constitutional Amendment on Education Funding Heads to 
the House Floor, KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 4, 2018 8:09 PM), https://www.kansasci
ty.com/news/politics-government/article207953054.html [https://perma.cc/259U-ML
RK]. 
 174. See Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Conservatives Renew Push for a 
Constitutional Amendment on Schools after Ruling, WICHITA EAGLE (June 26, 2018 
5:57 PM), https://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article213856059.html 
[https://perma.cc/3RLT-JS9L] (explaining the proposed constitutional amendment 
that will limit judicial oversight of education finance). 
 175. Dion Lefler et al., Kansas School Funding Still Inadequate, Supreme Court 
Says, KAN. CITY STAR (June 25, 2018), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article213797099.html [https://perma.cc/G8TF-79LE].  
 
190 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38: 1 
powers theory. The Court clapped back, stating “[i]nherently the 
supreme court must have the power to protect its own jurisdiction, 
its own process, its own proceedings, its own orders, and its own 
judgments.”176 
C. Fourth Wave: Federal Right to Adequate Education Is 
Hopeful but Not Optimistic. 
Michigan students brought a federal claim for a right to 
literacy. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the case demonstrates 
the beginning of a new wave of litigation: a federal right to an 
adequate education. 
i. Michigan Tests the Waters of Federal Adequacy Right. 
In 2016, seven students in Detroit brought an action against 
the State of Michigan, specifically claiming that literacy is a 
fundamental right under the federal constitution, which they have 
been denied.177 The complaint alleged the state’s failure to  create 
“any system for literacy instruction and remediation in Plaintiffs’ 
schools.”178 Additionally, the complaint used test scores and 
statistical data to show that the “Priority Schools”179 that Plaintiffs 
attend are continuously in the bottom tier of Michigan schools, 
ranking only one to six percent out of a hundred.180 The complaint 
also alleged unsafe conditions and vermin infestations inside these 
 
 176. Gannon, 443 P.3d at 304 (quoting Chi., Kan. & W. R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of 
Chase Cty., 21 P. 1071, 1071 (Kan. 1989)). The Court also cited to Montoy v. State, a 
previous school finance case where the court held “the State had enacted legislation 
in substantial compliance with our orders . . . . And we dismissed the case. Before 
the State fully implemented the financial solution we accepted in Montroy IV, 
however, it started making significant cuts to education funding in school 
year . . . 2008–09 (fiscal year 2009).” Id. at 296 (citing Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755 
(Kan. 2006). 
 177. Snyder Complaint, supra note 103, at 24–25. 
 178. Id. at 73. 
 179. Id. at 20 (“Priority Schools are those schools in the bottom 5% of a complete 
top-to-bottom list of schools published annually. The ranking is based on a number 
of factors, including minimal students outcomes in a number of subject areas, low 
achievement coupled with declining performance or large achievement gaps, or a 
combination of multiple of these factors.”). 
 180. Id. at 66–67 (“A school’s percentile rank reflects how the school ranks against 
all other schools in the State. For example, a score of 70 means that the school 
performed better than 70% of Michigan’s ranked schools . . . . Plaintiffs’ schools are 
among the very lowest-performing schools in the State. For the most recent ranking, 
the 2013-2014 school year, the State assigned Hamilton a 4 percentile rank; Osborn 
MST a 1 percentile rank; Osborn Evergreen a 2 percentile rank; and Cody MCH a 6 
percentile rank.”). 
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schools.181 After detailed examples of how these Detroit schools are 
failing Plaintiffs, the complaint puts forth data showing graduation 
rates,182 employment rates,183 and health studies184 all indicating 
literacy plays a fundamental role on an individual’s life and affects 
the community at large. 
Despite the surplus of information, Plaintiffs’ complaint was 
dismissed with prejudice.185 The court held that Plaintiffs failed to 
compare other Michigan schools with different racial compositions 
demonstrating that the schools Plaintiffs attended, comprised 
largely of children of color, were treated differently than schools 
with a greater population of White students.186 Therefore, they 
failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently on account 
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.187 
Additionally, the court held that the state was not required to 
provide a minimally adequate level of education, and there was no 
fundamental right to literacy under the Due Process Clause.188 
This first attempt at a federal adequacy right proved 
disappointing for Plaintiffs. In many states the claims would have 
been better brought under a state education clause, but the 
Michigan Constitution does little more than encourage education:189 
“Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means 
of education shall forever be encouraged.”190 The Michigan 
Constitution goes on to mandate a free education191 and enumerate 
the duties of the State Board of Education,192 but nowhere does it 
 
 181. Id. at 10, 77–98. 
 182. Id. at 70–73. 
 183. Id. at 34–35 (“Adults with low literacy face a significant economic 
disadvantage, earning lower wages and experiencing higher unemployment rates. 
NAAL data reveals that 43% of adults with the lowest levels of literacy live in 
poverty, as compared to only 4% of those with the highest levels of literacy.”). 
 184. Id. at 37–39 (citing Terry C. Davis et al., Low Literacy and Violence Among 
Adolescents in a Summer Sports Program, 24 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 401, 411 
(1999) (“One study of adolescents from low-income neighborhoods found that youth 
who read two years or more below grade level were more likely to engage in risky 
behaviors and be in a physical fight that required medical treatment than youth who 
were reading at grade level.”). 
 185. Gary v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 369 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
 186. Id. at 367–68. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 365. 
 189. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. § 2. 
 192. Id. § 3. 
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provide for an ‘adequate’ or any other measured type of education. 
Because the education clause here provides little instruction to the 
legislature or to the courts, young Michigan adults who cannot 
read193 have no remedy under the state or United States 
Constitution. 
IV. Minnesota’s Civil Rights Legacy Turns Disappointing in 
Late Twentieth Century, but Cruz-Guzman Has the 
Capacity to Right Past Wrongs. 
Cruz-Guzman provides an opportunity for Minnesota to return 
to its proud legacy of civil rights after decades of segregated 
facilities plaguing educational stability. The court decisively ruled 
on foundational issues allowing Cruz-Guzman to continue to the 
next phase of litigation. 
A. Minnesota Legislature Abandons Promise to 
Desegregate. 
Minnesota has long been one of the greatest champions for 
civil rights,194 carrying that title through the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.195 For many years, Minnesota sought to make 
the sentiments of Brown a reality for school children.196 In the 1980s 
and 90s, however, regression began to plague the Twin Cities and 
segregation became a familiar reality. In a series of unfortunate but 
predictable, events, the Minnesota legislature and school boards 
began moving further away from a unitary school system.197 
In 1972, Minneapolis was subject to a desegregation order, 
stemming from Booker v. Special School District No. 1.198 Following 
 
 193. See Alia Wong, Students in Detroit are Suing the State Because They Weren’t 
Taught to Read, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com
/education/archive/2018/07/no-right-become-literate/564545/ [https://perma.cc/QSG4
-DYUK] (discussing reasons for dismissal). 
 194. See MYRON ORFIELD, INST. OF METRO. OPPORTUNITY, INTEGRATION AND NEW-
SEGREGATION IN MINNESOTA: DRAFT REPORT, 5 (2018) [hereinafter ORFIELD]. 
 195. Id. at 1, 9–16. 
 196. Id. at 16. 
 197. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968) (“The 
transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate 
end to be brought about . . . .”). 
 198. Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No.1, 351 F. Supp 799, 809 (D. Minn 1972); Brief  
of Amicus Curiae Myron Orfield at 4, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2017) (No. A16-1265) [hereinafter Orfield Brief]; INST. OF METRO. 
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that decision, “the court helped guide policies such as school 
boundary decisions, and conducted annual reviews of the district’s 
progress towards integration.”199 A ‘short’ ten years later, the 
desegregation order dissolved without a ruling that Minneapolis 
schools were “integrated or unitary.”200 Without the order and with 
a noticeable uptick in minority student populations, districts began 
to re-segregate.201 In response, the Minnesota State Board of 
Education proposed a desegregation rule that used “flexible racial 
ratios as integration targets.”202 A wave of “political backlash” 
destroyed these proposals and forced the Board to dismantle.203 
Later in 1998, a new Statement of Need and Reasonableness 
(SONAR)204 was released that starkly contradicted the 1978 
version205 released after Booker. 
 
The SONAR’s rendering of the law would flip the logic of many 
integration plans on their head: rather than being mandatory 
in cases of de jure segregation, and voluntarily implementable 
elsewhere, race-conscious remedies would be forbidden in all 
cases except where there was proof of intentional 
discrimination. Most voluntary integration plans would become 
illegal.206 
 
De facto segregation of students would become the harsh 
reality across Minnesota schools. During the following two decades, 
 
 199. Orfield Brief, supra note 198, at 4. 
 200. ORFIELD, supra note 194, at 6 (citing Memorandum Order at 5, Booker v. 
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 4–71 Civil 282) (June 8, 1983)) (“The Minneapolis 
desegregation order was dissolved in 1983, in order give [sic] the district ‘the 
opportunity for autonomous compliance with constitutional standards.’ Notably, the 
court did not find that the Minneapolis school district was integrated or unitary, and 
received assurances that the State Department of Education was ‘willing and able to 
assume the duty of monitoring the further implementation of the District’s 
desegregation/integration plan.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 201. Id. at 6. 
 202. Id. at 6–7. 
 203. Id. at 7–8. 
 204. See Minn. Dep’t of Educ., Statement of Need and Reasonableness for 
Proposed Amendments to Rules Governing Desegregation (1998) [hereinafter 
SONAR 1998]. 
 205. Orfield Brief, supra note 198, at 4–5. (“In a 1978 Statement of Need and 
Reasonableness (SONAR) supporting a rule regulating de facto school segregation, 
the Attorney General and the Board of Education declared that, reading the 1869 
prohibition on segregation in pari materia with the 1967 Minnesota Human Rights 
Act, the legislature’s intent to regulate de facto discrimination was clear.”). 
 206. Id. at 9 (citing Margaret Hobday et al., A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota’s 
Failed Experiment with Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 936, 
955–58 (2009)). 
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the Minnesota legislature and Department of Education207 
continued to weaken the State’s ability to correct rampant 
segregation occurring across school districts.208 Today, the 1999 
Minnesota Desegregation/Integration Rule,209 adopting the 1998 
SONAR requirements, remains the authority on Minnesota 
desegregation.210 
Coincidently, in 1993, Minnesota became one of a growing 
number of states to find a fundamental right to education in the 
state constitution.211 In Skeen v. State, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court decided a school financing case that included seventy-six 
school districts, where the plaintiffs were complaining that the 
increase of student population in their districts in comparison to the 
decrease in population of other districts led to “disparities in 
educational opportunity” based on the current financing scheme.212 
However, the plaintiffs did not “challenge . . . the adequacy of 
education in Minnesota,” because the plaintiff districts all “met or 
exceeded the educational requirements of the state.”213 Nor, were 
inner-city districts, like Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth, parties to 
the case,214 because the State placed a “higher property tax rate on 
commercial entities.”215 The Minnesota Supreme Court found the 
state’s financing system was constitutional in all respects, but also 
held that “education is a fundamental right under the state 
constitution.”216 This decision is important because it provides an 
avenue through which future education litigation may be brought. 
 
 207. The State Board of Education was dismantled among the “political backlash” 
that spurred from the Board’s proposal in 1994 where they would have the authority 
to define “racial balance” and “equal educational opportunities.” See id. at 21–22. 
 208. Id. at 9–15; Margaret C. Hobday et. al., A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota’s 
Failed Experiment with Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 936, 
938 (2009). Contra Cindy Lavorato & Frank Spencer, Back to the Future with Race-
Based Mandates: A Response to Missed Opportunity, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1747, 
1751 (2010) (arguing the current Desegregation/Integration rule is sufficient to 
encourage diversity of public schools). 
 209. See Minn. R. 3535.0100–.0180 (2009). 
 210. In 2015 the Department of Education released a new SONAR defending a 
proposed rule that failed to strengthen desegregation efforts and in many ways 
weakened the previous rule. The one positive provision mandated charter schools 
would now have to be in compliance with the rule. However, this rule never passed. 
Minnesota desegregation is still governed by the 1999 rule. See ORFIELD, supra note 
194, at 25–26. 
 211. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993). 
 212. Id. at 303. 
 213. Id. at 302. 
 214. Id. at 302–03. 
 215. Id. at 302. 
 216. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). 
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B. Promising New Case Could Right Old Wrongs. 
In Cruz-Guzman v. State the court held in a sweeping victory 
for plaintiffs that their claims under the education, due process, and 
equal protection clauses of the Minnesota Constitution were 
justiciable. 217 Additionally, the legislature was not protected by the 
speech or debate clause, nor were school districts necessary parties 
to this litigation. These promising rulings on foundational issues 
indicate the court will be receptive to the claims that segregation 
alone can create an inadequate education. 
i. Claims Brought under the Education Clause Were 
Justiciable. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the hyper-segregation of public schools, 
particularly in Minneapolis and St. Paul, have led to disparities in 
achievement.218  It is because of these conditions that the plaintiffs 
claim the legislature has failed to meet its duty under the education 
clause, which states in full: 
 
The stability of a republican form of government depending 
mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the 
legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public 
schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by taxation 
or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools throughout the state.219 
 
The state contended that Plaintiffs’ complaints raise a purely 
political question and thus are not justiciable.220 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court held otherwise using previous case law to illustrate 
the many times the court has been asked to interpret the education 
clause.221 The court concluded that the judiciary was entitled to 
“adjudicate whether the Legislature has satisfied its constitutional 
duty under the Education Clause,” because if it were not that would 
“leave Education Clause claims without a remedy.” 222 It is the 
judiciary’s duty to interpret the constitution and adjudicate 
 
 217. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2018). 
 218. Id. at 6, 7–10. 
 219. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. 
 220. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 7. 
 221. Id. at 7–10. 
 222. Id. at 9. 
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whether the legislature and other rule-making authorities are in 
compliance with that constitution.223 
ii. Claims Brought under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses Were Justiciable. 
Plaintiffs alleged the state denied students’ fundamental right 
to an adequate education by violating the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the Minnesota Constitution.224 The state 
contended that there was no “qualitative component” to the 
education clause which defined “adequate.” Thus, for the court to 
rule on Petitioners’ equal protection and due process claims, it 
would need to define an “adequate education” and engage in 
educational policy-making.225 The court again rejected the state’s 
contentions and relied on Skeen, stating: 
 
The fundamental right recognized in Skeen was not merely a 
right to anything that might be labeled as “education,” but 
rather, a right to a general and uniform system of education 
that is thorough and efficient, that is supported by sufficient 
and uniform funding, and that provides an adequate education 
to all students in Minnesota.226 
 
The court did not define “adequate” in any more certain terms 
than previous case law, but it did establish that it was well within 
the judiciary’s power to “assess whether constitutional 
requirements have been met and whether appellants’ fundamental 
right to an adequate education has been violated.”227 
iii. The Legislature Is Not Protected by the Speech or 
Debate Clause When Defending Claims under the 
Education, Equal Protection, or Due Process Clauses. 
The state contended that the legislature must be dismissed 
from the suit because the speech or debate clause “provides 
immunity from suit for any actions taken in their legislative 
capacity.”228 The clause reads as follows: 
 
 
 223. Id. at 8–10; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial 
review). 
 224. See MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 7. 
 225. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 11. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 12. 
 228. Id. at 13. 
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The members of each house in all cases except treason, felony 
and breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during 
the session of their respective houses and in going to or 
returning from the same. For any speech or debate in either 
house they shall not be questioned in any other place.229 
 
The court strongly rejected the full immunity of the legislature 
from any suit that arises under their legislative capacity. 
Explaining that the speech or debate clause has been interpreted to 
grant immunity for defamation when “discharg[ing] [ ] their official 
duties,”230 but does not “provide[] them with absolute immunity for 
violating a duty that the constitution specifically imposes on the 
Legislature.”231 The court held that it will not interpret the speech 
or debate clause “to immunize the Legislature from meeting its 
obligation under more specific constitutional provisions—the 
Education, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses.”232 
iv. School Districts and Charter Schools Were Not 
Required as Necessary Parties. 
The state contended that plaintiffs’ claims “directly implicate[ 
] actions only school districts and charter schools can take,”233 thus 
without these parties the case cannot proceed. In doing so, the state 
relied on section 555.11 of the Minnesota Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act, and Rule 19 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure.234 The former states, “[w]hen declaratory relief is 
sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any 
interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no 
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the 
proceeding.”235 Because the school districts and charter schools 
would be directly affected by the declaratory judgment of the court 
and any remedy sought by the plaintiffs would affect how the school 
districts and charter schools conducted business, the state argued 
that they should be parties to the suit.236 The court agreed with the 
district court, which stated the plaintiffs are “seeking ‘remedies 
 
 229. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10. 
 230. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 13 (quoting Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 
(Minn. 2010)). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. (alteration in original). 
 234. Id. 
 235. MINN. STAT. § 555.11 (2016); Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 13–14. 
 236. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 14. 
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from the State, not individual school districts or charter schools,’” 
and are thus not necessary parties.237 The court used the same 
reasoning when dismissing the state’s contentions under Rule 19,238 
stating “school districts and charter schools are not indispensable 
parties when relief is sought solely from the State.”239 
Consequently, the suit could continue forward without joining 
school districts or charter schools as parties. 
V. Let’s Try This Again: Separate Educational Facilities 
Are Inherently Unequal. 
To provide an adequate education to all Minnesota students, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Cruz-Guzman must first issue a 
desegregation order to apply broadly and become effective 
immediately. Second, the court should define “adequate” education 
to provide the legislature with tangible grounds for effectuating 
change and provide plaintiffs with multiple avenues for relief. 
A. Ordering Desegregation 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should order the legislature to 
develop a desegregation plan statewide. First, the correlation 
between segregated schools and inadequate education has a long 
and sordid history. Second, the court only lifted its original 
segregation order240 because the state had assured the court it 
would continue to desegregate Minnesota schools, which it has 
failed to do.241 
Sixty-five years ago, in Brown v. Board of Education, the 
effects of school segregation were first chronicled: “[t]o separate 
[children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in 
a way unlikely ever to be undone.”242 While the opponents of school 
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integration reform point to de-facto segregation as the result of 
choice, it is the same as sanctioned243 segregation by law, when the 
state could do something to prevent it, but chooses not to.  When 
Minneapolis was first ordered by Judge Larson to desegregate its 
public schools,244 there was no law on the books permitting 
segregation. Quite the contrary, Minnesota enacted legislation to 
prohibit racial segregation in public schools as early as 1869,245 and 
a statute has continued the prohibition.246 Regardless, Minneapolis 
schools were found to be operating under de-facto segregation and 
were ordered to integrate.247 The state of the law has not changed. 
Segregation is still illegal, and de facto segregation warrants a court 
order to integrate, whether that be in 1972 or 2019. 
Furthermore, the continued segregation of Minnesota schools 
will cost the state more money in the long term than spending the 
money now to fix the broken system.248 The Center on Society and 
Health at Virginia Commonwealth University found that “[r]acial 
segregation reduces educational and job opportunities and is 
associated with worse health outcomes.”249 This translates to a 
continuously growing class of individuals that cannot secure well-
paying jobs and are forced to depend on government programs, 
resulting in higher taxes for everyone. 250 The deficit between the 
classes will continue to grow and without a strong middle class the 
economy will become unstable.  
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The Minnesota Department of Education fell short on their 
promises to “assume the duty of monitoring the further 
implementation of the District’s desegregation/integration plan.”251 
Where the court lifted the desegregation order to allow the school 
district “the opportunity for autonomous compliance with 
constitutional standards,”252 the court should be equally willing to 
impose an order where—after thirty years—Minnesota schools are 
still unconstitutionally segregated. 
B. Defining Adequacy 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should define “adequate,” so 
that the legislature is better equipped to address each factor and 
develop policies to effectuate change. This definition would force the 
legislature and school boards to look beyond the financing schemes 
and instead place a premium on what is actually at stake: the 
fundamental right to an education. The court could adopt the Rose 
factors,253 or create its own definition by expanding the precedent 
discussed in Cruz-Guzman.254 
First, if the court adopted Rose, the state would have seven 
factors to measure each grade-level, school, and district. This 
adoption would enable claims, like that in Cruz-Guzman, to 
demonstrate a lack of qualitative criteria to support the assertion 
that segregative schooling results in inadequate education. For 
example, where only 23% of Minneapolis’s Black students 
“demonstrated a proficiency in reading,”255 which is a fundamental 
building block to “sufficient oral and written communication 
skills,”256 there would be a per se violation of the first Rose factor.  
Additionally, with each factor the state could develop testing 
criteria to gauge student achievement. Likewise, where graduation 
rates for students of color are disproportionately lower than those 
of White students,257 then they would not be as equipped to 
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“compete favorabl[y] . . . in academics or in the job market”258 as 
similarly situated students nationwide, thus failing the seventh 
Rose factor. The Rose factors would provide plaintiffs an avenue for 
litigation that is not currently available. Without defining 
adequacy, plaintiffs are left to compare test scores from surrounding 
areas, drawing inferences of inadequacy from the achievement gap. 
Second, the court appeared poised to define “adequate” in 
Cruz-Guzman and could expand on their reasoning to establish a 
definition. The court began by finding the fundamental right to an 
education established in Skeen “was not merely a right to anything 
that might be labeled as ‘education,’”259 nor could the government 
“‘herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates.’”260 
Instead the fundamental right to an education was found in the 
Minnesota Constitution which has at least three qualifiers for the 
type of education and school system: (1) intelligent people, (2) 
general and uniform, (3) thorough and efficient.261 When the 
Education Clause begins with an impetus on the “intelligence of the 
people,”262 then “[t]he framers could not have intended for the 
Legislature to create a system of schools that was ‘general and 
uniform’ and ‘thorough and efficient’ but that produced a wholly 
inadequate education.”263 
The court also pointed to the long history of adequacy 
expectations in Minnesota which began in 1871, when the court 
stated, “all may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit 
them to discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the 
republic.”264 In this technological age, the duties of citizens have 
changed tremendously. No longer are positions in unskilled labor 
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plentiful, nor do they provide a living wage.265 Additionally, young 
Black and Hispanic men are disproportionately represented in high 
school dropout rates which significantly reduces their potential 
income while exponentially raising the likelihood of 
incarceration.266 Not only is this incongruent with “all may be 
enabled to acquire an education,” but it also puts a greater financial 
burden on society267 as opposed to equipping citizens with the 
ability to contribute to society, or to “discharge intelligently their 
duties as citizens of the republic.”268 The interpretation of the 
Education Clause in 1871 should ring true today. The lack of 
qualitative criteria, however, has allowed the state to become 
complacent and the fundamental right to an education hollow. 
The court has the tools and the authority to craft a definition 
of “adequacy” using the Minnesota Constitution and legal 
precedent. In Cruz-Guzman, the court further acknowledged its role 
in defining terms in the constitution by stating it “is an intrinsic 
part of our power to interpret the meaning of the constitution’s 
language . . . . The very act of defining the terms used in the 
Education Clause and determining whether the constitutional 
requirements have been met inevitably requires a measure of 
qualitative assessment.”269 
If the court defined “adequacy” with qualitative criteria, three 
results would occur. First, plaintiffs would have an avenue to 
pursue litigation where the criteria are not met, and the legislature 
could be protected where marked improvement in defined areas 
supports its efforts to correct the wrong.270  Second, the first line of 
defense for the state would no longer be what is adequate and where 
does it say that in the Minnesota Constitution? Instead, judicial 
precedent would clearly establish what the legislature’s duty is in 
relationship to a student’s fundamental right to an education. 
Third, a clear definition of “adequacy” would provide future 
plaintiffs an avenue for relief. Where the continued segregation of 
minority students and inadequate education, not financing, are in 
question, the claim would be even more direct by establishing how 
segregated schools repeatedly fail to meet the qualitative criteria of 
adequacy. No longer would plaintiffs rely on inferences, but instead 
would show the failings of particular factors of the definition, and 
 
 265. See supra notes 39, 40–46 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text. 
 268. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 12. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
2020] Inherently Unequal 203 
the legislature would have to grapple with the true causes of the 
failings rather than skirting the issue and pointing to financing 
schemes. 
Conclusion 
Segregation in education continues to plague the United 
States. Minnesota should be the first to issue a strict desegregation 
order and reclaim its proud tradition of leading the way for civil 
rights.271 With a hopeful glance towards the future, Cruz-Guzman 
provides much needed relief to the students in the Minneapolis and 
St. Paul school districts. In a footnote, the court stated: 
 
It is self-evident that a segregated system of public schools is 
not “general,” “uniform,” “thorough,” or “efficient . . . .” 
Regardless of whether the context is a “traditional” segregation 
claim or a different type of claim, courts are well equipped to 
decide whether a school system is segregated, and have made 
such determinations since Brown . . . .272 
 
These discrete but poignant words emphasize the Court’s 
power to protect Minnesotan school-children from the devastative 
effects of segregation. Cruz-Guzman provides Minnesota an 
opportunity to again lead the nation in Civil Rights.273 On remand, 
the court should uphold the ideals laid out in Brown—separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal—and move towards an 
education system that promotes equal opportunities for success to 
all students.   
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